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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah

I

SMITH BROTHERS LUMBER
COMPANY.
Plaintiff-Respondent,
VS.

Wf LLIAM E. JOHNSON and his ~
wife, LILA .JOHNSON,
Defendants-Appellants.

BRIEF OF
APPELLANTS
Case No.

10701

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action brought by the Plaintiff-Respondent
to enforce a Mechanics Lien against a !'mbsequent purchasE>r of real property without notice.
DISPOSITION OF LOWER COURT
The case was tried to the Court. From a judgment for
thE> Plaintiff, Defendants appeal.
RELIEF SOFGHT ON APPEAL
Defendants seek a reversal of the judgment and a
judgment in their favor as a matter of law.

2

The Plaintiff, a Ftah Corporation, engaged in the
lm:-;in<':-;:-; of marketing hnildinµ; :-;upplies, furnished builrl-

ing supplies from materials in stock to L

Edward

Skabelund, for the purpose of making certain improvements on the Skabelund property in Logan. Delivery
of the materials was made between March 5, 1963 and
August 6, 1964, which was the last of such deliveries.
Mr. Skabel und being a carpenter by trade did the work
himself after hours and on holidays, and in the course
of the construction incorporated all of the materials
furnished him hy the Plaintiff of the value of $1,927.16,
for which he paid tht> sum of $1,270.lL leaving $657.05
due and owing at tlw tinw of the commencement of this
action.
On June 29, 1964,

~William

E. Johnson, one of the

Defendants, purchased the property on which the improvements had been made without actual knowledge
of the outstanding deht.
On October 7, 1964, the Plaintiff filed a ''Notice of
Intention to Claim a Lien", it being 62 days after the
last delivery of materials to the building site.
The Plaintiff thereupon brought this action to enforce
the supposed lien which it had filed notice of intention
to claim.

3

ARGUMENT
POINT NO. 1 : THE COPRT ERRED IN FINDING
'l1HA 'l'

'l'HJ;~

PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT WAS AN

''ORIGINAL CONTRACTOR" FOR THE PURPOSE
OF SEC'l'ION 38-1-7, U.C.A., 1953, AND AS SUCH HAD
J1jJGHTY DAYS WI'l'HIN WHICH TO FILE NOTICE
OF INTENTION TO CLABf A MECHANICS LIEN.
POINT NO. lA: SECTION 38-1-3, r.C.A, 1953,
('l'HOSJ;J J1~NTITLED TO LIEN) CREATES FOUR
CLASSES OF POSSIBLE LIENORS: 1. CONTRACTORS. 2. srBCONTRACTORS, 3. LABORERS BY
THE DAY OR PIECE, 4. MATERIALMEN.
According to Section 38-1-7, U.C.A., 1953, there are
three distinct periods limiting the time allowed different classes of lienors to file a notice of intention to
claim a lien.
1.

J1~ighty

days after the completion of the "Original

<>on tract".

2. 8ixtv
. daw;
. after the last material delivered or la-

hor done.
~. 8ixt~·

days after the original contract is completed.

Limitation No. 3 pertains to those operating at the
insistence of the original contractor and includes "a
subcontractor or any person furnishes labor or materials" ... Limitation No. 1 pertains to "original con-
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tractors''. 11' the total sd1eme of classification of possible lienors contemplates only "original contractors"
and "subcontractors'' then the limitation No. 2 is a
ust>ll:'ss and confusing provision.
Section :38-1-:3, FC.A., 1%3 (rl'HOSE ENTITLFJD TO
LIFJN) defines not two hut four classes of lienors and
says "CONTRACTORS, SUBCONTRACTORS (2)
and all persons PFJRFOR~fING LABOR (4) upon or
Fl~RNTSHING MATl<~RIALS (3) to he used in, the
constructlon ... shall have a lien on the property ... ''
Whl:'n we superirnpose on this section the three distinct
periods of limitation for filing (as per Section 7) we
find the 60 da~· after last delivery period a meaningful
and sensible provision. If we, however, disregard the
classification and sa~· that groups (3) and (4) do not
exist separately lrnt arc• onl~· repetitive definitions of
Contractors and Subcontractors 60 days after last delivery as well as the order of satisfaction (as per section 14) and the priority of claims (as per Section 6),
becomes not only meanin,gless and of no effect, hut also
senseless and confusing of the whole scheme of liens
and lien holders as described by the other sections of
the chapter. FnleRs we want to walk blindly through the
remainder of the sections we must affirm the existence
of the traditional group of lien holders widely and commonly known as '' Materialmen'' who supply materials
from their stocks at regular prices AND without bidding
or any of the other normal attendant characteristics of

5

a genuine contractor's contract.
The classes so set forth by this section is carried consistently through the sections of the chapter which have
relevence to the classes of lienors (Section 3), priority
of claims (Section 6), order of satisfaction (Section 14),
the equal footing:-; of materialmens and laborers liens
(Section 10).
Section 38-1-6, lT.C.A., 1953, clearly designates four
elasses of people eligible for the benefits of the chapter
of the code " ... due to an ORIGINAL CONTRACTOR
( 1) from the owner of any property subject to lien under
this chapter shall be valid as against any lien of a SUBCONTRACTOR (2) or MATERIALMAN (3) and no
sueh attachment, garnishment or levy upon any money
due to a SPBCONTRACTOR (2) or MATERIALMAN
(3) from the CONTRACTOR (1) shall be valid as
against any lien of a LABORER EMPLOYED BY THE
DAY OR PIECE (4).
Section 38-1-3, U.C.A., 1953 contemplates the identical scheme of classification: "CONTRACTORS (1),
SUBCONTRACTORS (2), and all persons PERFORMING LABOR (4), or FURNISHING MATERIALS (3)
to be used in, the construction ... ''
Section 38-1-14, P.C.A., 1953 also re-identifies the
classes for the purpose of order in satisfaction of decree:
''In every case in which liens are claimed against the
same property the decree shall provide for their satis-

{j

faction in the following order: 1. Sl'BCONTRACTORS
who are laborers or nwehanies who are working for
thf:' da:-· or piece.''
'l'l1e Idaho Code follows the same scheme but is somewhat clearer in making the distinctions. In Section 45-

5-12 Judgment to declare priority, (this is comparable
to Section 38-1-14, P.C.A., 1%3).
1. All laborers, other than contractors or subcontractors.
2. All 1T aterialrnen othf:'r than contractors or sub<'Ontractors.
3. Subcontractors.
4. 'l'he original Con tractor.
Certainly all of tlwse (as in the Utah code) possible
lienors have a relation which is contractual in nature.
'l'he conclusion from hoth Codes is obvious, that all those
who have contractual relations are not either Contractors or Subcontractors, there are two other groups, Laborers (defined as those working by the day or piece
in Utah, 42 Ida 391, 246 P 962) and 1\faterialman (one
who furnishes materials to he used). Since all have
contractual relations of a sort the dividing factor is
the nature and extent of that relation, and based on that
distinction some will he elassified as ''Contractors'' and
some as "Materialrnen", though both are furnishing
matt>rials and hoth have some sort of contractual re-
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la ti on. '' '11he evidence on behalf of the Gem State Lumber
Company is sufficient to support a finding that it was
a rnateriahnan and entitled to a lien as such. "Supra" ..
We must then look at the contractual relation between
tlie parties to S{'e it' they are those of a "Contractor" or
mere I>' those of a "l\faterialman ".
'l'l:P onl>' suhstantial difference between the TTtah

statute and the Idaho statute is that the priorities are
re-arranged, the classification has remained consistent.
Fndt>r the l'tah statute the rnaterialman and the subcontractor are given equal priorities, while the lahorer
ii;; ,givt>n first priority.
Sections 14-2-1, Idaho Code, 14-2-2, Idaho Code Bond
Stats. talk of materialmen.
In fop st>eond paragraph of the seventh section of this
chapter, there is a separation of those who are operating
at the insistence of the original contractor into two
groups, SUBCONTRACTORS, and ANY PERSON
WHO FURNISHES LABOR OR MATERIALS AT
TI-IF~ INSTANCE AND REQUEST OF AN ORIGINAL
CONTRACTOR. Even on the subcontractor level (or
on the level of those operating at the insistence of the
original contractor) there is a distinction between those
on contract (technical Subcontractors) and those working at the insistence of the Contractor but not on "contract'' to do so (who are laborers by day or piece or material suppliers). For the purpose of setting periods of

8
filinµ: of limitation both of these categories are grouped
together "then such Sl-BCONTRACTORS or PERSON'S liE>n rights,

. are extended so as to make the·

final date for the filing of a notice of intention to hold
and claim a lien sixty days after competion of the original contract of the original contractor". Had there
hf'f'n no contemplation of separate categories for "1\laterialmen'' and Lahore rs h~' the day or piece'' (as opposed to Subcontractors) thf' articulation of this section
would not have shown such careful protection of the
rightr-; of this otht>r µ:ronp of furnishers or labor and
materials.
The definitions in Section 2 are useful in understanding the intent of thf' distinction in Sections 19, 21 and 22,
hut we contend shonl<l not he allowed to destroy the
meaning and intE>rnal eonsistE>ncy of the remaining and
most important sections of the chapter (and those which
are uniquely in point in this litigation).
Much of the diffi<'ulty in interprE>ting what the definitons in Section 2 mean and were meant to effect might
hinge around what was meant by the words "by contract". If the legislaturP mE>ant a traditional building
or corn;;truction contra<'t with a customer discrete job
to be done at a eertain total pricf' and not jmit any obligation which might expressly or impliedly arise from
an off the shelf dispem;ing of individual items for use
in construction, thE>n Contractor as defined in Section 2

9

would be consistent not only with Sections 19, 21 and 22,
but 'vith the 'vhole chapter, in that it would allow for
the existence of MA 'f}~RlALMEN and LABORERS BY
1'HE DAY OR

Pll'X~J<~.

And if the wording "all other

persons doing work or furnishing materials shall be
deemed subcontractors'', was intended to mean all other
persons doing work or furnishing materials by contract
express or implied ''at the insistence of an orif,!;inal contractor, shall he deemed Subcontractors, then Subcontractors, for the same reasons as stated above would
be a useful category, consistent with not just a part hut
all of the chapter.
POINT NO. lB: SECTION 38-1-7, U.C.A., 1953 (NOTICE OF CLAIM - CONTENTS RECORDING),
CLASSIFIES LIENORS IN ACCORDANCE WITH
SF,CTION 3, AND ALLOWS MATERIALMEN SIXTY
DAYS FROl\I THE DATE OF THE LAST DELIVERY
OF MATE~RIALS TO FILE A NOTICE OF TNTENTTON TO CLAIM A LIEN.
The wording· of Section 7 illustrates its consistency
with the classification scheme of Sections 3, 6, 10 and 14.
PERIOD
1. 80

days after the
completion of the original contract

CLASS TO WHICH IT IS
APPLICABLE
Original Contractors (those
eontractors who are operating under a specific contract
directlv with the owner.)

JO

2. GO days after last
material delivered or
labor done

)IA'fERlALMEN
AND
LABORERS (Lahorers who
work by the day or piece,
and materialmen who furnish goods directly to the
owner hut are not on ''contractors'' analagous t o
working by the day or pit>ef•
by laborers.)

days after the
contract by the original contractor has
hPPn completed

SUBC 0 N T RA C T 0 R S
(those who labor or materials or both at the insisten<'<'
of the original contractor
or are on a specific contrnf't
to do so.)

::. 00

POINT NO. l C: 1'HJ1~ PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT'
IS A "MATERIALMAN" AND NOT AN ORIGINAL
CON1'RAC1'0R F'OR THF, PPRPOSES OF SECTION
SKVEN.
One furnishing, under a contract with the owner, materials to be used in the construction of a building is
a materialman and not an original contractor within
the provision of the mechanics lien law relating to the
time for filing a lien. SP ARKS v. BF1'1'F, COUNTY
GRAVEL MIN. CO. (1880) 55 Cal 389: Heacock Sash
and Door Co. v. w PathPrford ( 1931 ) rn5 or 153. 294 p
344.
141 ALR 324 b. FrRNTSHING i\fA1'ERTALS ONLY

''Generally, one who merely furnishes materials to
the OWNER or a contractor is a matPrialman, and not

11
a contractor or a subcontractor, within the meaning of
mechanic's lien laws.''
Am J ur 36 l\f echanics Liens Section 52 MATERIALM:EN
The right to assert a mechanics lien is now generally
extended to materialmen or THOSE PEOPLE WHO
SUPPLY MATERIALS FOR THE STRUCTURE AND
HAVE NO OTHER CONNECTION WITH THE
WORK.
36 Am .Tur (1966) supplement page 7 to supplement
note 20 page 47 "Nor is one who merely furnishes material a ''contractor'' within the meaning of mechanics
lien laws.
36 Am Jur Section 165 WHO IS A "CONTRACTOR"
A "Contractor" within the provisions of a mechanics
lien statute with limit liens of subcontractors, laborers
or materialmen for material or labor furnished to the
contractor to the amount earned but unpaid on the contract, or which give such liens by subrogation, IS ONE
WHO WOULD BE CHARACTERIZED AS A CONTRACTOR IN THE COMMON SPEECH OF MEN.
AND WE THINK NOT JUST A BUILDING SUPPLIES CUSTOMER.
RINN HAMMOND LUMBER CO. v ELSON 171
Cal 570 154 P 12
That literally, a subcontractor is one who agrees with
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another to perform a part or all of the obligation whi<'h
the second party owes by contract to a third party, hut
that the word has much narrower meaning in mechanics
lien law which divides the liens into four classes. to-wit,
laborers, 111aterialmen, subcontractors and original contractors, that the term subcontractor as so used must he
determined by referen<'e to this classification and to the
i,rnbjeet to which it relates, and embraces all persons who
agree with the original contractor to furnish the material
and construct for him on the premises some part of the
structure which the ori,ginal contractor had agreed to
erect for the owner, and that persons who merely furnish materials to the ('ontractors to be used and which
are used, in the eon:-:truction of the huilding- come within
the second elass - as rnaterialmen.
FORSEBERO v. KOSR CON8'l'R. CO. (1934) 218

IOWA 818, 252 N·w 258
One who delivered :-:and was not a subcontractor hut
a materialman.

STAPLES v

ADA~1~.

PAYNF, AND GLEAVES

( 1914) CCA 4th) 215 F' :122, in refere nee to one who
furnished materials to a building contractor it was
stated that whether· he was a subcontractor was doubtful, that there was no attempt to prove the existence of
a <'ontract entered into an~, time, or for any definite
ciuantity of materials, that nothing more was shown than
an ordinary running account between a dealer and his
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customer, that the building contractor, each of whose
purchases was a separate transaction, was free, at any
time, to purchase elsewhere, and that is as the Court
supposed, there was a clear distinction between a subcontractor and a materialman, it was unable to see that
the furnisher of the materials was anything more than
a materialman. "Holding that one who furnished materials to a building contractor on a running account
did not serve in time the required notice to the owner
under a statute making the latter personally liable to
a subcontractor to the extent of the amount due from
the owner to the original contractor, the Court said
that he was nothing more than a materialman.
WILSON ET AL v. HIND ET AL (1896) 113 Cal
357' 45 p 685.

1. A person contracting to furnish material for a
building, such as doors, sashes, blinds, etc., which, instead of manufacturing to order, he purchased ready
made is a materialman only.''
FISHER ET AL V. TOMLINSON ET AL 1901 40
Or 111, 60 P 390, 66 P 696 at 697 ... His letters to Plain.
tiffs to the effect that he had secured the contract to
furnish all the shop work, sash, doors, glass, etc., do not
intimate that he was to place in the building, as a part
thereof any of the material ordered. He was therefore
as the evidence clearly shows, only a materialman . . .
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F'INl.u\Y \'. 'l'AOHOL!\I 1911 G2-Wash 341.113 P
1os;~. 1084.

''The third point urged, that the appellant is a suh<'ontractor, is without merit. If one who furnishes the
:-;a:-;J1es, door:-;, and g-lass for a huilding iR a suhcontrartor,
<>vPry mat<->riahnan would fall in that class, and such
<'Onstruction would nullif~· the plain terms of the statute.
STE PH Ij~NS Lr.\I BER CO Y. TOWNSEND-STARK
CORP. (1924) 228 :\lirh 182, 1999 NW 706, 201 NW 213.
A lumber eompan~· doing· no "'ork on the premises. but
onl~· furnishing lumher and door frames and window
frames and othPr thing-:-; whirh it carried in stock and
did not have to rnannfartnre arcording to the building
rontractor':-; sperifi<·ations, is a materialman, and not

a contractor, and tl1NPforP, <>ntitlf'd to a lien without
filing the affidavit reqnirf'd of <'ontractors.
FORMAN Y. ST. <H~Rl\IATN (1900) 81 Minn 26, 83
N'V 438. Owner orderf'd gfaRs df'livered and installed hy
the furnislwr was not a <'ontrartor hut a materialman.

Thf'rf' has lwf'n no assPrtion that the Plaintiff made
any improvements on tla 111atf'rialfl to makf' them more
suitable for the partirular joh in whi<'h th(ly were to be
used, or that he aided in their inHtallation in the building.
In fact then• is nothing to indicate that the relation of
the Plaintiff and the Defendants was any morf' than a
1
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customer or purchaser and seller. The agreement entered
into by the parties was the kind that any casual customer implies or expresses, and the Defendant was not
hound by it to continue buying from the Plaintiff, he
could have at any point ceased his purchases and become
the customer of any of a variety of other firms. The
Plaintiff is at most a supplier of materials and as such
did not meet the time requirements exacted of his class
of lienors for filing a notice of intention to claim a lien.
For these reasons and those stated in the body of the
argument we pray the Court for a reversal of the judgment entered below.
Respectfully submitted
DAINES & THOMAS
Attorneys for Appellants

